UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/51
18 January 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 17 JANUARY 1999 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit, enclosed herewith, the Statement of H.E. Mr. Milan Milutinovic, President of the Yugoslav constituent Republic of Serbia, of 16 January 1999 concerning the most recent developments in Kosovo and Metohija, the Autonomous Province of Serbia.

I should be very grateful if you would have this letter and its annex distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Vladislav JOVANOVIC
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

99-01028 (E) 180199

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Annex

Belgrade, 16 January 1999

THE STATEMENT BY H.E. MR. MILAN MILUTINOVIC,
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA

In the wake of the statement of Ambassador William Walker, head of the OSCE verification mission in Kosovo and Metohija, the President of the Republic of Serbia, Milan Milutinovic, made the following statement:

When yesterday (15 January) police undertook to arrest terrorists who killed a police officer Svetislav Przic in a terrorist attack, in the vicinity of the village of Racak, municipality of Stimije, terrorist attacked them from automatic weapons, portable launchers and mortars. The police had to respond to such terrorist savagery, in line with their powers. The OSCE mission and Ambassador Walker were duly informed of the undertaking at the arrests. Immediately after the clash, an investigating team headed by an investigating judge of the Pristina District Court Danica Marinkovic and the Deputy District Prosecutor arrived at the scene but the terrorists who took positions on the neighboring hills, opened fire and prevented the on-site investigation.

Today, on 16 January, the on-site investigation was once again prevented because William Walker demanded the investigating judge to go there without police protection, thereby preventing the competent judicial authorities from carrying out their legal obligations. However, at the same time, Ambassador Walker accompanied by foreign journalists and journalists of Albanian separatist newspapers, whom he personally invited, visited the scene and took advantage of the absence of judicial and other state authorities so as to make a statement containing falsehoods and personal assessments which are totally baseless. He even went so far as to personally assess what had happened, to pass judgements and even give orders what should be done next - and all that in a sovereign country.

In this act of deceiving the world public opinion, according to well-known recipes attempting to stage some kind of new "Markale", Ambassador Walker secured the full cooperation of his proteges from the terrorist so called "KLA". With a series of lies and fabrications he accused our State authorities in an obvious attempt to divert the attention from terrorists, murderers and kidnappers and to once again protect them the way he has been protecting them all along. Ever since he came, he turned a blind eye only to the crimes of the terrorists. Security of citizens, security and responsibility of the police does not interest him and in his today's statement he has passed judgements on the authorities of Serbia and Yugoslavia, their competent authorities and accused them of "violating the cease-fire" - for what if not for the protection of terrorists to whose crimes he has remained silent.

The attacks of terrorists, even when launched from mortars and other heavy weapons he does not consider to be illegal. Such an attitude did not come for the first time to the fore in his statement and in his attempts to prevent the investigating judge to carry out her duty according to the laws of her own

country. He probably forgot that he is not a Governor or a Prosecutor or a judge in Serbia or in the FRY but the representative of the organization of 54 equal states and the head of the mission whose task is not to rule the territory of a sovereign country but to observe and report accurately. By his statement of today, he got carried away because he seems to favor the role of the prosecutor and the judge at the same time.

Even though it is indisputably clear that the police was provoked and compelled to defend itself from terrorist attacks, Mr. Walker today ignored that fact and proclaimed the event as a conflict with the civilian population. Confronted with the actual facts in today's meeting with the Yugoslav authorities' representatives, Mr. Walker stated astoundingly that the world would anyway believe his version and not arguments and facts.

At the same time, without informing the Yugoslav authorities, he visited the village of Racak, seeking to ensure monopoly on the interpretation of what had actually happened. In this way, he most grossly violated his mandate of a verifier as well as the Agreement with the OSCE.

This is just another glaring example of not only a one-sided approach but of protecting terrorism and the self-proclaimed terrorist organization, KLA.

Such conduct of William Walker proves that he is not behaving as a representative of an international organization, but a representative and protector of separatism and terrorism. Lies are always more important to them than facts and truth. The Serb people has already paid a high price for such lies and will not allow such behavior any more.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/52
18 January 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 18 JANUARY 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ALBANIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to enclose herewith a copy of the letter of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Albania, H.E. Mr. Paskal Milo, addressed to You with reference to the last massacre of Recak, in Kosova. The original of this letter will be sent at the earliest convenience. I would appreciate if this letter would be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ambassador Agim NESHO
Permanent Representative

99-01034 (E) 180199

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Annex

Letter dated 16 January 1999 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Albania addressed to the Secretary-General

The last tragic event in Reçak of Kosova, the atrocious massacre against ethnic Albanian civilians, urges me to write to You and express the deepest concern of the Government of Albania.

In a moment when the International Community is looking and calling for an urgent and peaceful solution of the conflict in Kosova, when the international relief organisations are trying to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe, the last genocidal act proves that there is no willingness to cooperate from the Belgrade regime. This cruelty is only the latest one in the chain of Serb carnages. It cannot be an incident, but a well planned and executed policy of scorched land and ethnic cleansing.

The Reçak massacre constitutes at the same time a provocation to the international organisations and especially to the United Nations which are already involved in finding out a peaceful solution to the conflict. It also indicates that the Milosevic's regime has never been and will never be in favor of a peaceful solution.

The Albanian Government is of the opinion that the last event constitutes a grave act with serious consequences for the peace in the region, which is under a real threat in this respect, we urge Your immediate engagement in order to prevent the genocide of the Albanians in Kosova. The Albanian Government has already asked for an urgent meeting of the Security Council. We believe that the Serb provocation towards the willingness of the international community to restore peace and security in the region should be addressed in an appropriate way by the Security Council, and by using all the means at its disposal, including those which fall under the Chapter VII of the Charter.

We are confident that Your outstanding personality and the commitment of the United Nations to the principles of peace and security will be invaluable in bringing this conflict to an end.

(Signed) Paskal MILO

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/53
19 January 1999
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 19 JANUARY 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BURUNDI TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you the text of the statement made by Mr. Léonce Ngendakumana, President of the National Assembly of Burundi, before the Security Council at its meeting held under the Arria formula on 12 January 1999.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Gamaliel NDARUZANIYE
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

99-01140 (E) 190199 190199

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Annex

Statement made by the President of the National Assembly of Burundi before the Security Council on 12 January 1999

On behalf of the National Assembly of Burundi and on my own behalf, allow me first of all to convey to you best wishes for 1999. May this year bring the best prospects for peace and development for all mankind. I should also like to thank you for affording us this wonderful opportunity to address the Security Council in these early days of 1999, which has been designated a year of hope by the vast majority of Burundians.

Beleaguered by a conflict that is over 30 years old and by an unprecedented crisis dating back to October 1993, Burundi has been the scene of atrocities for the past few years: large-scale massacres motivated by political and ethnic factors, the devastation of the economy, the destruction of all the State's infrastructure, uncontrolled population movements to and from Burundi, the birth of new phenomena such as camps for displaced and regrouped persons, the formation of armed groups, as well as other atrocities which I refrain from describing here.

Several attempts have been made to settle the conflict in Burundi. In recent times, armed confrontation has been tried. Nevertheless, all attempts at a settlement have failed because Burundians have not yet had the courage to get together and face the truth about the management of their country's future, people, and economic and social development.

Today the moment of truth has arrived. For the first time since the crisis of October 1993, we Burundians are beginning a new year with a clear political vision of our country's political, institutional and socio-economic future.

Recognizing the many roadblocks faced by Burundi since October 1993, mindful of the supremacy of the interests of the nation as a whole over sectarian and selfish interests, convinced that the logic of confrontation, demonization and globalization can only lead to the disintegration and disappearance of the nation, anxious to foster a State based on law and democracy, we Burundians have decided to subscribe to the principle of comprehensive political negotiations as the only means of producing an effective and lasting settlement of the conflicts.

It is in that context that the authorities in power since 25 July 1996 and the National Assembly constituted after the elections of June 1993 have opted for national rebirth, irrespective of their institutional origins, and have undertaken to settle the Burundian conflict by establishing a vast movement for peace, democracy and development. Accordingly, a comprehensive peace process has been designed on two complementary fronts: one internal, the other external.

On the internal front, the national debate has resulted in a domestic political partnership for peace, which involves the National Transition Assembly and the Government, jointly and actively, in the process of national

reconstruction. This partnership took concrete shape with the agreement on the political platform of the transition regime, signed on 6 June 1998, and the Constitutional Act of Transition, issued on that day.

The political platform sets forth general guidelines on matters fundamental to Burundians, such as democracy, human rights, peace and security for all, justice, genocide, economic revival and the reconstruction of Burundi. The Constitutional Act organizes the institutions.

On the external front, comprehensive peace negotiations open to all the political protagonists, including the armed groups, began on 15 June 1998 in Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania, under the auspices of President Julius Nyerere. The negotiations are proceeding smoothly.

Today the people of Burundi, the Facilitator of the negotiations on the conflict in Burundi and the international community welcome the fact that the comprehensive peace process in Burundi has been launched definitively and that hopeful signs are visible.

As far as we are concerned, this favourable assessment of the ongoing peace process in Burundi must be accompanied by concrete measures to relieve the suffering of the Burundian people. The political initiatives and efforts will fall short of expectations unless there is effective support from the international community to redress the socio-economic situation and reconstruct the country.

The economic and social indicators amply demonstrate the wretched conditions being endured by the Burundian people because of the crisis and its many repercussions. This suffering and impoverishment of our people cannot be allowed to continue much longer. That is why we are calling on the friends of Burundi and on the entire international community to mobilize and provide a minimum standard of well-being for the many people in Burundi now living below the poverty line.

We again appeal earnestly to the international community to support the comprehensive peace process in Burundi by doing everything within its power to ensure that:

(a) War and violence in Burundi cease;

(b) The economic sanctions imposed on Burundi on 31 July 1996 are lifted;

(c) Bilateral and multilateral cooperation is resumed so that external financing is also resumed.

That would enable us to engage in genuine comprehensive negotiations on designing a society safe and secure for all, to rehabilitate the victims of the tragedies in our history, to revive the nation's economy, and to reconstruct the country and preserve it from the risk of further destruction tomorrow.

The Government of Burundi and the National Transition Assembly call on all their partners to take account of our firm commitment to pursue to the end the peaceful settlement of the Burundian conflict through political negotiations.

In closing, I should like to thank you once again for your kind attention to our urgent appeal. The people of Burundi look forward to your invaluable contribution in helping them to pursue the peace process and overcome all the obstacles standing in the way of that process, particularly the economic blockade against Burundi and the freezing of cooperation.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/54
19 January 1999
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 19 JANUARY 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BURUNDI TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the statement delivered by the delegation of Burundi at the talks on Burundi held in New York by the United Nations Department of Political Affairs, the United Nations Development Programme and the Canadian Government on 11 and 12 January 1999 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Gamaliel NDARUZANIYE
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

99-01158 (E) 200199 200199

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Annex

Statement delivered by the delegation of Burundi at the donor conference for Burundi held in New York on 11 and 12 January 1999

On behalf of the Government of Burundi, my delegation and on my own behalf, I should like first of all to extend best wishes for happiness and prosperity to you and to the countries and organizations you represent.

I should also like to thank the United Nations and the Canadian Government for hosting the current meetings following those held in Ottawa last August. The Government of Burundi welcomes its partners' continued concern to find ways and means of helping it to emerge from crisis and resolutely pursue socio-economic development.

Since the meeting in August 1998, Burundi has made significant progress along the path to peace. The third session of the Arusha negotiations was held in October to widespread approval, and in December 1998 three of the five committees to be established embarked on an in-depth debate. Work will continue at the fourth session, which is to be held shortly. The consensus reached between the Government of Burundi and the other parties to the negotiations on the essential option of resolving the crisis through negotiation is to be welcomed. The political will of the various sides to reach a conclusion, namely to achieve a comprehensive peace settlement, is no longer in doubt.

In any event, the Government of Burundi solemnly reiterates, should there be a need to do so, its irrevocable commitment to that end.

However, three constraints on the negotiating environment must be raised to ensure that the negotiations harbour hope for the people of Burundi.

The first concerns the economic sanctions imposed by the subregion. The Government welcomes the realization on the part of the international community that these sanctions are counter-productive. They must be lifted without delay to relieve the sufferings of our people, who have been plunged into despair as a result of the terrible deterioration of their living conditions; otherwise the population will have great difficulty supporting the peace process under way in Arusha and within the country.

Similarly, there must be an immediate cessation of violence. To that end, the Government believes that the participation in the negotiations of the armed groups of the rebellion is indispensable. It would seem to be the only means of ensuring an effective ceasefire on the ground and a lasting peace for all. How could an armed conflict be settled otherwise? The process must be wholly inclusive. Our friends and partners would do much to enhance the substance of the process and give it real momentum if they could convince the Facilitator and other parties of this imperative.

The last and not least important constraint concerns the freeze on bilateral and multilateral cooperation. The Government of Burundi has noted

much procrastination in this regard. Some partners suspect that the Government would not be prepared to pursue the negotiations once external pressure ceased to be applied.

One cannot imagine, even for one moment, that the Government of Burundi would enter into the process on false pretences. The peace being negotiated is not for the region, the Facilitator or the international community, but for the people of Burundi themselves. It is they who are the most directly concerned, and it is they who will be the prime architects of that peace.

In fact, no external injunction was made for the holding of secret negotiations in Rome or for the negotiation and conclusion of a political partnership between the National Assembly and the Government! In fact, the time has come to leave the past behind. The people of Burundi are spontaneous in their desire to forge a better future: one of peaceful cohabitation, national reconciliation and integrated development.

I call upon you to consider the situation with discernment and realism. The people of Burundi are in economic distress and need international support and cooperation to enable them to get back on their feet, not tomorrow but today, with all, and not just some, of their needs met.

The Government of Burundi commends those partners who have already decided to resume cooperation. It hopes that this meeting will lead to further resumption by giving a firm nudge to those partners still undecided, in anticipation of an international go-ahead.

Burundi's needs for reconstruction and the resumption of social and economic development are immense. Owing to the war, the embargo and the freezing of international cooperation, the current situation is extremely precarious, and there are major threats both to the survival of the population and to the Government's continuation of its efforts to achieve lasting peace.

As we recently noted in Ottawa, between 1993 and 1996, Burundi's gross domestic product (GDP) declined by about 20 per cent in real terms while its inflation rate, which prior to 1993 (the year before the crisis) had never reached double digits, rose to its highest levels, from 15 per cent in 1994, 19 per cent in 1995 and 29 per cent in 1996 to 31 per cent in 1997. As a result of the decline in exports and the freeze on external financing, the Burundi franc (FBu) has continued to depreciate, falling from FBu 240 to the dollar in 1993 to FBu 500 to the dollar in 1998, a depreciation of more than 100 per cent in five years.

In the social sphere, all indicators have also declined. Thus, in five years the infant mortality rate rose from 113.8 deaths per 1,000 live births to 127.1 deaths. School enrolment declined by 26 per cent over the same period and poverty increased dramatically, currently affecting over 80 per cent of Burundi's population. The nutritional situation has deteriorated significantly. Certain diseases, such as typhus and cholera, that had presumably been eradicated, are resurfacing, while others, such as malaria, are taking a terrible toll owing to a lack of medicine.

Today around a million people have been affected by the crisis: there are currently 500,000 displaced persons in Burundi, and another 500,000 living in neighbouring countries. All these people suffer from illness, hunger, malnutrition and unemployment and lack shelter and drinking water: they are living in unbearable conditions. The destruction of public infrastructures has aggravated the crisis, making access to basic services, such as health care and education, very difficult.

Any discussion of the constraints on Burundi's economy must include the external debt burden. In 1997, Burundi's outstanding external debt was equivalent to over 130 per cent of its GDP. On average, one third of Burundi's export income is allocated to debt-servicing, which represents 17 per cent of its budget, or 3 per cent of its GDP. The weight of external debt has been felt even more acutely since a large number of Burundi's partners have halted their financial assistance. In spite of increasing difficulties over the years, aggravated by the persistence of the crisis and the embargo, Burundi has continued to honour its external debt commitments, particularly to partners that have maintained their financing programmes.

This policy has been extremely costly insofar as net transfers have steadily and considerably declined. In 1997, net transfers amounted to less than $2 million, while in 1992 they totalled more than $72 million.

The complexity and the extent of the problems to be addressed, especially efforts to combat poverty, the seriousness of which has recently been pointed out both in the World Bank Annual Report and in the report of the United Nations Development Programme, call for the mobilization of significant financial resources well beyond Burundi's means. For this reason, increased and sustained assistance from the international community is essential in order to ensure the success of the ongoing peace process and the improvement of the living conditions of Burundi's impoverished population.

In this regard, the Burundian Government's four priorities in the area of economic recovery are: rehabilitation of the affected population; restoration of basic infrastructures; support for agriculture; and support for the economic recovery programme.

A. Rehabilitation of the affected population

At a time when there are still half a million displaced persons in Burundi and another half a million living abroad who are expected to return, the increasing demands for housing, health care and basic necessities often call for prompt action.

The new approaches recommended for assisting distressed populations focus essentially on their reintegration into productive life. In this regard, the first step in the rehabilitation of the affected population is to resettle them; the second is to reintegrate them into social and economic life so that they can take charge of their lives as quickly as possible.

B. Restoration of basic infrastructures

A successful reconstruction programme will entail restoration of basic socio-economic infrastructures such as the health, education, water-supply and production infrastructures, the promotion of income-generating micro-projects and other economic supports.

C. Support for agriculture

The agricultural sector, on which virtually the entire population of the country is dependent, has been jolted by the crisis as a result of the destruction of livestock and the lack of agricultural inputs, particularly fertilizers and seeds. Households that have already been impoverished by a generally depressed economic climate have become increasingly vulnerable and can only improve their food and nutritional situation only through urgent measures to increase agricultural productivity.

To this end, the following priorities are recommended:

- Distribution of agricultural inputs;

- Rehabilitation and reinforcement of seed production centres;

- Promotion and extension of adapted integrated systems for agriculture, forestry and herding;

- Support for groups, particularly those involved in the production and processing of agricultural products and input suppliers;

- Assistance in the rational exploitation of drainage basins and marshes and with efforts to enhance their profitability;

- Support for cattle restocking.

D. Support for the economic recovery programme

While the aforementioned emergency measures are intended chiefly to combat poverty through community approaches at the grass-roots level involving income-generating micro-projects, it is imperative that a real transition from the emergency and reconstruction phase to development in a broader macroeconomic perspective be undertaken immediately.

The contributions sought from the international community should take the form of active support for the implementation of priority programmes to be identified in the National Economic Reconstruction and Recovery Plan now in preparation. Apart from the emergency programmes just described, the Plan calls for supplementary action with particular emphasis on the following:

(a) Restoration of production facilities, with priority given to the development of rural areas, where 90 per cent of the population lives;

(b) Establishment of appropriate mechanisms for development financing;

(c) Restoration of major macroeconomic equilibria, including the balance of payments and the budget.

Conclusion

The Government of Burundi calls upon its partners to:

1. Convince the countries of the subregion to lift the embargo immediately;

2. Convince the Facilitator of the peace process that the effective participation of the armed groups of the rebellion in the negotiations is absolutely necessary;

3. Accommodate the irrevocable political will of the Burundian Government to seek a full resolution of the crisis through political negotiations;

4. Resume bilateral and multilateral cooperation without delay. The Government of Burundi considers that the linkage some partners would like to impose between a resumption of cooperation and the final peace agreement is totally unjustified.

A resumption of cooperation would make it possible to:

- Strengthen the ongoing peace process by rehabilitating the economy;

- Alleviate poverty and give the people hope;

- Reintegrate displaced persons and rebuild destroyed infrastructures;

- Launch socio-economic recovery projects immediately.

Thus once this important meeting is over, the Burundian people looks forward to receiving from you, its friends and partners, concrete support and commitments to consolidate the peace process and revitalize development with a view to improving its social and economic well-being.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/55
19 January 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 12 JANUARY 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ALBANIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon instructions and on behalf of my Government, I have the honour to transmit the comments of the Republic of Albania on your last report (S/1998/1221) pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1160 (1998), 1199 (1998) and 1203 (1998). Your report testifies to the constant concern of the United Nations on an issue that has become crucial for peace and stability in the Balkans.

I would like to recall that the agreement of 13 October 1998 between President Milosevic and the United States Special Envoy, Richard Holbrooke, which was achieved under maximal pressure from the international community, aimed first of all at bringing to an end the cycle of violence that pushed the Albanian population of Kosova to the brink of a humanitarian catastrophe. It also intended to create the most basic conditions for the return of the refugees and displaced persons, thus establishing the basis for confidence-building measures, the normalization of life and the initiation of a genuine political process. The above-mentioned agreement quite rightfully pointed to the withdrawal of the military and the police forces, and the amnesty law to be adopted by the Belgrade authorities, as the key measures for the start of a positive process in Kosova.

As of now, such provisions are far from being implemented, and the return of the displaced persons, to the extent that it has been occurring, is attributable mostly to their desperate situation and the lack of alternative choices of survival. In our opinion, the strong presence of the Serb military and police in Kosova is the source of insecurity and of the incidents which have been of growing concern lately. We strongly believe that the Belgrade authorities are far from the spirit of the October 1998 agreement; in reality they are trying to impose a pax serba, which is demonstrated by their punitive operations and the continuation of the scorched-earth policy. Therefore, the Belgrade authorities should be criticized directly and held accountable more firmly on matters pertaining to pointing out the responsible parties for the explosive situation in Kosova.

The Republic of Albania is facing the consequences of the increasingly aggressive acts of the Yugoslav army, especially at the border with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). In the first week of

January 1999 alone there were five serious incidents provoked by the Yugoslav side, such as intrusions of Yugoslav military units into Albanian territory, trespassing of Yugoslav airplanes in Albanian airspace and the shelling of the Albanian villages inside the territory of the Republic of Albania. Since March 1998, incidents of such nature have become recurrent on the border with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). It is worth pointing out here that in none of the cases has the Yugoslav party responded to the request of the Albanian counterpart to call a meeting of the Joint Border Commission to analyse the border incidents, as stipulated in the agreement between our two countries.

In the meantime, the Yugoslav officials refuse to call the Albanian party in order to verify the alleged incidents on their side of the border. In this context, we would like to stress that these acts of provocation at the border of the Republic of Albania, along with continuous allegations on the existence of terrorists' training camps (a deliberate mischaracterization of the refugee camps by the Belgrade authorities) in the territory of the Republic of Albania, as the whole bear the danger of the intensification of the Serb violence and the potential spreading of the conflict in the country of Albania. High-level authorities of Belgrade have alluded to the latter probability.

On behalf of my Government, I would like to reconfirm the willingness and the readiness of the Government of Albania to cooperate in finding a peaceful solution to the problem of Kosova. The Republic of Albania, more than any other country, is very interested in finding such a solution, which would benefit the Albanian people of Kosova, the Serb people and all the other peoples of the region. The Government of Albania is working to this end on an international as well as a regional level and with the different political actors in Kosova. My Government is of the firm conviction that the United Nations, through your authority, and other international organizations will intensify efforts towards neutralizing the factors of war, and in so doing preventing, after Bosnia, another tragedy from happening in the Balkans.

I should be very grateful if you would have the text of the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Agim NESHO
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/56
19 January 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 18 JANUARY 1999 FROM THE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Fully appreciative of your interest in the situation in Kosovo and Metohija, the Autonomous Province of the Yugoslav constituent Republic of Serbia, I am enclosing herewith a copy of the letter dated 18 January 1999 from the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Mr. Zivadin Jovanovic, addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Norway and Chairman-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Mr. Knut Vollebaak (see annex), concerning the declaration of Ambassador William Walker, Director of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission, as a persona non grata by the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. As you will see from the enclosed letter, the Yugoslav Government took the decision exclusively because of the unacceptable, unprincipled and insulting behaviour of Ambassador Walker towards the Yugoslav State and Government.

I take this opportunity to assure you that the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is firmly committed to the principles and goals of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international law, as well as to cooperation with the international community, the United Nations in particular, and to a consistent implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions on Kosovo and Metohija. At the same time, however, I should like to point out that the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia are determined in their resolve to continue their cooperation with the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission in accordance with the Agreement reached on 16 October 1998, aimed at creating conditions for a lasting, peaceful and political solution of the situation in Kosovo and Metohija, which remains the first priority of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Enclosed herewith is also an information sheet on the police operations of search and arrest of a terrorist group in the village of Racak near Stimlje on 15 January 1999 (see enclosure).

I should be very grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its enclosures distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Vladislav JOVANOVIĆ
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Annex

Letter dated 18 January 1999 from the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Norway and Chairman-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

As you are aware, paragraph 8(1) of the Agreement on the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Verification Mission in Kosovo and Metohija, signed on 16 October 1998, states that the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations applies to the Mission.

The Head of the Kosovo Verification Mission, Ambassador William Walker, through the overall attitude he displayed in his capacity as the Head of the Kosovo Verification Mission by insulting the dignity and usurping the authority of the competent State organs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as the host country, has flagrantly violated the provisions of the Vienna Convention as well as the provisions of the Agreement of 16 October 1998. Having this in mind and proceeding from article 9 of the Vienna Convention the Federal Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia decided today to declare Mr. William Walker, the Head of the Verification Mission in Kosovo and Metohija persona non grata. Accordingly, Mr. William Walker is obliged to leave the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 48 hours.

I avail myself of this opportunity to reiterate the readiness of the Federal Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to continue its full cooperation with the Kosovo Verification Mission as well as with OSCE, in the consistent implementation of all agreements confident that this is in the mutual interest of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and OSCE and in accordance with the efforts towards a lasting political solution in Kosovo and Metohija, which is our fundamental goal.

(Signed) Živadin JOVANOVIĆ

Enclosure

Facts regarding police operations of search and arrest of a terrorist group in the village of Racak near Stimlje on 15 January 1999

In the early morning of 15 January 1999, police officers blocked the village of Racak, municipality of Stimlje, in an attempt to arrest a terrorist group.

Five days before this arrest operation, the terrorist group killed police officer Svetislav Przic in the village of Racak. This terrorist group committed many criminal acts of terrorism punishable under article 125 of the Penal Code of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, by killing police officers Sinisa Mihajlovic, Nazmija Aluri and Svetislav Przic, a member of the Urosevac police reserve, Stimlje police station (they were killed in attacks carried out on 10 September and 29 October 1998 and on 10 January 1999); Sasa Jankovic and Ranko Djordjevic, members of the Gnjilane police reserve (killed on 2 August and 12 October 1998), and by killing civilians Miftar Resani (on 31 December 1998) and Enver Gasi (on 2 January 1999). In the municipalities of Urosevac and Stimlje, this terrorist group abducted members of the Albanian as well as of the Romany ethnic group and burned the house of Djemalj Bitici, an Albanian from the village of Racak (on 18 November 1998).

As they approached the village of Racak, the terrorist groups attacked police officers from trenches, bunkers and fortifications, using automatic weapons, portable grenade launchers and mortars. In this attack police officer Goran Vucicevic was wounded, while a number of official vehicles of the Interior Ministry of the Republic of Serbia were damaged. In response to the attack, police officers used firearms and destroyed the terrorist groups. Several dozen terrorists were killed in the fighting, the majority of whom were wearing uniforms with the insignia of the terrorist so-called KLA.

On this occasion, police officers confiscated one 12.7 mm Browning machine-gun, two submachine-guns, 36 automatic rifles, two snipers, a large amount of ammunition and hand grenades, radios and other military equipment.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Kosovo Verification Mission was informed of the beginning of the arrest operation and arrived at the scene of the fighting.

Immediately after the fighting, the police investigating team came to the scene headed by Investigating Magistrate Danica Marinkovic of the Pristina District Court and the Deputy Public Prosecutor, Ismet Sufta, but the terrorists who were concentrated in the neighbouring highlands opened fire and prevented the further on-site investigation.

The next day, on 16 January 1999, the on-site investigation was again prevented because the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission insisted that the Investigating Magistrate carry out the investigation without the police presence, explaining that the fighting might be resumed.

In the wake of undertaking this police operation of search and arrest of the terrorist group because it had committed terrorist attacks, murders and abductions of police officers and citizens in the Urosevac and Stimlje areas, the Head of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission, Mr. William Walker, immediately accused "the Yugoslav security forces" of the massacre of 45 civilians in the village of Racak, which he had "seen" himself, and gave an ultimatum that investigators of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia must be allowed to come to Kosovo and Metohija in the following 24 hours. He stated at the press conference that the villagers had guided him to the site where he saw bodies of 20 murdered civilians ("who had obviously been executed where they lay" and that "none were in other than civilian clothes" and "looked like humble village inhabitants"). He stated that the Kosovo Verification Mission had counted 36 while the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission had established that there were 45 victims.

Mr. William Walker declared this whole conflict a conflict with the civilian population, disregarding the fact that they had been armed, had been arrested by the police and had engaged in attacks on the police. He also omitted the fact that the police had been attacked, provoked and forced to defend themselves using firearms against the armed terrorist attacks. His statement, given to the Kosovo and Metohija government officials who had informed him of all the facts, that the world would believe him rather than the arguments and facts by legal authorities of our country, was shocking.

At the same time, Mr. William Walker himself, without informing the Yugoslav authorities, visited the village of Racak and was accompanied by his associates. In this way he expressed an obvious attempt to monopolize the interpretation of developments and to approach the establishment of actual facts with prejudice. He disregarded the fact that the Yugoslav authorities are sovereign in every part of the State territory and are solely competent to establish the facts, within the framework of legal proceedings and in the presence of the Kosovo Verification Mission, and to publicize the truth. By his behaviour, false and malicious interpretations, disrespect of the competent Yugoslav authorities and laws, Mr. Walker violated most flagrantly his verification mandate and the Agreement with OSCE.

On 17 January 1999, the Head of the Coordinating Team of the Commission for Cooperation with the OSCE Verification Mission in Kosovo and Metohija of the Federal Government, Mr. Dusan Loncar, sent a protest note to the Head of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo and Metohija, Mr. William Walker, because of his behaviour, in particular because of the prevention on his part of the on-site investigation in the village of Racak aimed at objectively establishing the true course of events. The on-site investigation, which was scheduled for 17 January 1999, in the period from 8 a.m. to 1 p.m., with the request that Mr. Walker should verify the on-site investigation, did not begin because of the attack, launched from the villages of Rance and Petrovo, by Albanian terrorists who used mortars and machine-guns. On this occasion, one of the launched grenades fell near Magistrate Danica Marinkovic, while grenades launched by the terrorists directly endangered the lives of police officers and the security of the Magistrate.

At the same time, protest was expressed to Mr. Walker because of the prevention of an on-site investigation by the Magistrate, with the request that the verifiers be engaged exclusively in the function of verification of the investigation and the work of the Magistrate and her security.

During this police action, Mujota Sadik (b. 1943), a terrorist from the village of Malopoljce, the municipality of Stimlje, as well as his daughter who was an active member of the terrorist organization, the so-called KLA, were killed. Mujota and his brothers, three sons and a daughter, headed the terrorist group consisting of a number of persons who participated in many terrorist attacks against the Interior Ministry officers and members of the Army of Yugoslavia in the municipality of Stimlje.

Subsequent to the agreements signed by the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Mr. Slobodan Milosevic, and the United States Special Envoy, Mr. Richard Holbrooke, in the period from 13 October 1998 to 14 January 1999, in the region of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija, the Albanian separatists carried out a total of 599 terrorist attacks and provocations, of which 186 were launched against the citizens and 413 against the Interior Ministry officers. In these attacks 53 persons were killed (37 civilians and 16 police officers), 36 persons sustained serious injuries (13 civilians and 23 police officers), while 76 persons sustained light injuries (38 civilians and 38 police officers). A total of 43 persons were abducted (39 civilians and 4 police officers), of which 3 were killed (1 civilian and 2 police officers), 17 were released (16 civilians and 1 police officer), while the fate of 22 civilians and 1 police officer is still unknown.

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General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/53/798
S/1999/57
19 January 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-third session
Agenda item 62
QUESTION OF CYPRUS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-fourth year

Letter dated 13 January 1999 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government and further to my letter dated 18 December 1998 (A/53/765-S/1998/1209), I have the honour to draw your attention to a new violation of the flight information region (FIR) of Nicosia by military aircraft of the Turkish Air Force, recorded on 11 January 1999.

On that day, two F-16 military aircraft of the Turkish Air Force entered the Nicosia FIR, violating international air traffic regulations.

As stated in my previous letters, these Turkish unauthorized intrusions into the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus are in violation of international air traffic rules and, at the same time, they are in contravention of the provisions of the Security Council resolutions on Cyprus.

On behalf of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, I wish to strongly protest this new provocative act by Turkey which is a further reminder of Turkey's offensive disregard of international law, the Charter of the United Nations and all the relevant decisions of the Organization on the question of Cyprus.

I would like to underline that the present violation occurred soon after the adoption of Security Council resolutions 1217 (1998) and 1218 (1998), in which the Council called upon all States to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and to refrain from any action which might prejudice that sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. My Government expects that the Turkish side will show compliance with the provisions of these resolutions.

Such provocative actions are not conducive to reducing tension and run counter to the initiative of the Secretary-General announced on 30 September 1998, within the framework of his mission of good offices, with the

goal of reducing tensions and promoting progress towards a just and lasting settlement in Cyprus.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 62, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Sotos ZACKHEOS
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/58
19 January 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 18 JANUARY 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF AUSTRALIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to draw your attention to the statement released on 18 January 1999 by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia, Mr. Alexander Downer, concerning recent events in Kosovo (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the statement circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Penny WENSLEY

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

Annex

Statement issued on 18 January 1999 by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia

Australia condemns Kosovo massacre

The Government of Australia strongly condemns the massacre on 15 January 1999 of 46 ethnic Albanian civilians in Kosovo. It is understood that the dead include at least one child and several elderly men.

These killings of ethnic Albanian citizens by Serb security forces represent a serious escalation of the conflict. The massacre follows the shooting, by unknown assailants, of two of the unarmed Kosovo Verification Mission personnel on the same day.

The Government is supportive of the work done by the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and awaits the findings of its investigation with interest.

This massacre puts at risk the peaceful resolution of the Kosovo crisis, based on agreements negotiated in October under the threat of air strikes by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

It is very important that the armed forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serb police on the one hand, and the Kosovo Liberation Army on the other, refrain from provocative actions, movements or deployments which undercut efforts to implement the agreements reached in October.

We shall continue to closely monitor this situation and we await the outcome of talks between NATO General Wesley Clark and President Milosevic.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/59
19 January 1999
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 15 JANUARY 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 15 January 1999 from Mr. Mohammed Said Al-Sahaf, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq. The Minister calls attention to the violations and acts of aggression committed against Iraq by United States and other aircraft and naval vessels in the period from 1 July to 31 December 1998, including the brutal attack on Iraq that was carried out by the United States and the United Kingdom between 17 and 20 December 1998, and he points out that these two countries and the countries in which their aircraft are based, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Turkey, are to be held fully responsible for the consequences of such acts.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 15 January 1999 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the President of the Security Council

I refer to my letter dated 5 July 1998 providing detailed information on the violations and acts of aggression committed by United States and other aircraft and naval vessels in the period from 1 January to 30 June 1998 (S/1998/613, annex).

In the present letter, I wish to draw your attention to the fact that during the period from 1 July to 31 December 1998 such aircraft continued to violate Iraq's airspace in the south from bases in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and in the north from bases in Turkey. During this period there were 8,142 aerial violations in southern Iraq and 1,286 in northern Iraq, so that the total number of violations of Iraq's airspace during this period comes to 9,428.

On the present occasion, I have to inform you that on the night of 16 December 1998 the United States of America and the United Kingdom began a brutal armed attack on Iraq that went on for four days. During this time, Iraq was subjected to an assault using missiles and aircraft that was launched from bases in Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and that targeted residential neighbourhoods, hospitals, cereal storage depots, health centres, service installations, factories, houses of worship and historical antiquities and caused the deaths of hundreds of innocent civilians. By any standard, this act was a flagrant violation of the principles of international law and of the Charter of the United Nations, and it had no international authorization.

During the relevant period, United States warplanes engaged in such hostile, provocative and inflammatory acts as dropping heat flares and breaking the sound barrier over Iraqi civilian areas and establishments, and United States naval vessels also engaged in acts of aggression inside and outside Iraqi territorial waters. These acts were documented by us and were communicated to the United Nations Secretariat at the time they took place. They included those set forth hereunder by way of example.

1. At 1330 and 1400 hours on 1 July 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace over Umm Qasr.

2. At 1015 and 1100 hours on 2 July 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace over Umm Qasr.

3. At 1015 hours on 7 July 1998, a formation of two United States aircraft broke the sound barrier in the Saddam Dam area.

4. At 0917, 0935, 0940, 0950 and 1235 hours on 8 July 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace in the Umm Qasr area.

5. At 0805 and 0945 hours on 11 July 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace over Umm Qasr.

6. At 1203 hours on 11 July 1998, a formation of two United States aircraft dropped seven heat flares in the Rubay'ah area of Ninawa Governorate.

7. At 1030 hours on 13 July 1998, a formation of two United States aircraft broke the sound barrier over Mosul.

8. At 1110 hours on 14 July 1998, a formation of two United States aircraft broke the sound barrier over the Qaws area in Ninawa Governorate.

9. At 0845, 0853 and 0907 hours on 18 July 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace over Umm Qasr.

10. On 11, 12 and 13 July 1998 United States aircraft broke the sound barrier over Tall Afar, shattering window panes in some government offices and private homes and terrifying a number of residents.

11. At 1100, 1106 and 1800 hours on 4 August 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace over Umm Qasr.

12. At 1044, 1210, 1320 and 1335 hours on 5 August 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace over Umm Qasr.

13. At 1113 hours on 6 August 1998, two United States aircraft dropped 10 heat flares on Tall Afar in Ninawa Governorate.

14. At 1052 hours on 9 August 1998, a United States formation broke the sound barrier over Tall Afar in Ninawa Governorate.

15. At 1110 hours on 11 August 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace over Umm Qasr.

16. At 1024, 1200, 1330 and 1400 hours on 18 and 19 August 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace over Umm Qasr.

17. At 0915, 0920, 1035, 1100 and 1105 hours on 22 August 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace over Umm Qasr.

18. At 1226, 1747 and 1750 hours on 25 August 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace over Umm Qasr.

19. At 1615 hours on 25 August 1998, a small United States patrol boat escorted Iraqi boat No. 8, which is used to take pilots to the pilot station near Mina' al-Bakr, away from the port in an easterly direction to one of the frigates on station there to be checked and inspected. At 1845 hours the boat was released.

20. At 1307, 1326, 1502 and 1509 hours on 26 August 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace over Umm Qasr.

21. At 0930 hours on 26 August 1998, a United States naval craft and an armed helicopter intercepted an Iraqi fire boat near buoy 51 in the Khawr al-Zubayr waterway. The boat was searched and numerous questions were addressed to its

crew on the pretext that the purpose of the search was to implement Security Council resolutions. The boat was then required to proceed to a Canadian frigate bearing the number 95. Members of the United States forces who were present then boarded the Iraqi boat carrying various items of equipment. They searched the boat thoroughly and made copies of its papers and logs. At 1915 hours the boat was released.

22. At 1330 hours on 25 August 1998, a United States boat escorted the merchant vessel BAWNK, which was leaving Umm Qasr for the open sea, to the inspection zone. There it was searched. At 1815 hours it was allowed to proceed on its way.

23. At 0430, 1016, 1211, 1240 and 1737 hours on 27 August 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace over Umm Qasr.

24. At 1400 hours on 27 August 1998, a naval craft flying the United States flag approached the freighter Poland and demanded information on the vessel and on its cargo, flag State and port of registration before allowing it to leave.

25. At 1028, 1044 and 1325 hours on 5 September 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace over Umm Qasr.

26. At 1210 hours on 6 September 1998, a United States formation broke the sound barrier in the Jabal Maqlub area of Ninawa Governorate.

27. At 2340 hours on 7 September 1998, a United States patrol boat searched the Iraqi Maritime Transport Company merchant vessel Al-Abid, which had a cargo of wheat on board, at the entry to the Shatt al-Arab (coordinates 0284) as it was proceeding from Umm Qasr port to Basrah port. At 0230 hours on 8 September it was escorted to an unidentified destination to be searched. At 1800 hours on the same day the vessel was released.

28. At 1400 and 1430 hours on 11 September 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace over Umm Qasr.

29. At 1005 and 1015 hours on 13 September 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace over Umm Qasr.

30. At 1030, 1035, 1100, 1125, 1705 and 1730 hours on 14 September 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace in the Umm Qasr and Khawr al-Zubayr areas.

31. At 1221, 1311 and 1325 hours on 16 September 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace over Umm Qasr.

32. At 1700 hours on 16 September 1998, as the Iraqi Maritime Transport Company freighter Al-Bay'ah was on its way with a cargo of wheat from Umm Qasr port to Ma'qal port in Basrah by way of the Khawr Abd Allah waterway and the Shatt al-Arab channel, a helicopter from a United States frigate on station in the Arabian Gulf circled the vessel and hovered over it a number of times taking photographs. The pilot of the helicopter established contact with the master of the vessel and ordered him to change course.

33. At 1435 hours on 17 September 1998, a United States formation broke the sound barrier in the Ayn Zalah area.

34. At 1730 hours on 22 September 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace over Umm Qasr.

35. At 1200 and 1300 hours on 23 September 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace in the Umm Qasr area.

36. At 1540 hours on 24 September 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace in the Umm Qasr area.

37. At 1105, 1200, 1305, 1700 and 1755 hours on 25 September 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace in the Umm Qasr area.

38. At 1145 hours on 26 September 1998, a United States formation broke the sound barrier over Basrah.

39. At 1115, 1120, 1130, 1200, 1225, 1530, 1654, 1700 and 1750 hours on 26 September 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace over Umm Qasr.

40. At 1010, 1100, 1105, 1715 and 1730 hours on 27 September 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace in the Umm Qasr area.

41. At 1005, 1045 and 1120 hours on 28 September 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace in the Umm Qasr area.

42. At 1030, 1116, 1121, 1159, 1311, 1729 and 1744 hours on 29 September 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace in the Umm Qasr area.

43. At 1021, 1025 and 1255 hours on 30 September 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace in the Umm Qasr and Faw areas.

44. At 1130 hours on 5 October 1998, a United States formation broke the sound barrier in the Mosul area.

45. At 1005 and 1040 hours on 6 October 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace in the Umm Qasr area.

46. At 0905, 0910, 0915, 0920, 1145, 1150, 1635 and 1645 hours on 7 October 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace in the Umm Qasr and Faw areas.

47. At 0910, 0920, 0925, 0940, 1050, 1210 and 1215 hours on 8 October 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace in the Umm Qasr and Faw areas.

48. At 1045 hours on 8 October 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace over Nasiriyah.

49. At 0943, 1110, 1215, 1420 and 1145 hours on 9 October 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace in the Umm Qasr area.

50. At 0907, 0912, 0934, 1028, 1055 and 1612 hours on 10 October 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace in the Umm Qasr and Faw areas.

51. At 0912 and 1141 hours on 13 October 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace in the Umm Qasr area.

52. At 0915 and 0925 hours on 14 October 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace in the Umm Qasr area.

53. At 0935 hours on 15 October 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace in the Umm Qasr area.

54. At 1630 hours on 17 October 1998, a boat and a United States helicopter detained the privately owned tug Nur as it was towing a pontoon near buoy 7. It was escorted out to sea to be searched. At 1700 hours on the same day the inspection process was completed and the tug headed towards the Khawr al-Zubayr waterway.

55. At 2030 hours on 18 October 1998, United States forces intercepted the Honduran tanker Trapp Star, for which Mr. Husam Ja'far acts as agent, as it was leaving Khawr al-Zubayr port and close to buoy 5 in the Khawr Abd Allah channel. At 1100 hours on 24 October the tanker was escorted to Kuwait by United States forces.

56. At 0015 hours on 19 October 1998, the United States frigate Carr (No. 52) proceeded to search the freighter Rayshan, which was carrying a cargo of rice, at a point 5 kilometres south of Mina' al-Amiq near buoy 7 in the Khawr Abd Allah waterway. The freighter was ordered to change course or drop anchor at once. The pilot was required to reduce speed and to await further orders, the vessel having already been searched at the international inspection point. At 1325 hours on the same day the pilot was instructed to proceed.

57. At 1435 hours on 1 November 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace over Umm Qasr.

58. At 1045, 1110, 1515 and 1635 hours on 2 November 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace over Umm Qasr.

59. At 1026, 1030, 1100, 1210, 1510, 1533, 1539, 1635 and 1645 hours on 3 November 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace over Umm Qasr.

60. At 1150 and 1510 hours on 4 November 1998 United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace in the Umm Qasr area.

61. At 1426 hours on 9 November 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace over Umm Qasr.

62. At 1645 hours on 13 November 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace over Umm Qasr.

63. At 1625 and 1635 hours on 14 November 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace over Umm Qasr.

64. At 1218 hours on 16 November 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace over Umm Qasr.

65. At 1230 hours on 16 November 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace in the Saddam Dam area.

66. At 0930 hours on 17 November 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace over Umm Qasr.

67. At 1135 and 1140 hours on 18 November 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace over Umm Qasr.

68. At 0905, 1105, 1317 and 1645 hours on 19 November 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace over Umm Qasr.

69. At 1345, 1445 and 1500 hours on 25 November 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace over Umm Qasr.

70. At 1120 hours on 29 November 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace in an area 30 kilometres south of Samawah.

71. At 1103, 1156, 1245, 1415, 1530 and 1700 hours on 29 November 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace over Umm Qasr.

72. At 1138, 1141, 1200, 1255 and 1705 hours on 30 November 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace over Umm Qasr.

73. At 1148, 1230 and 1245 hours on 1 December 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace over Umm Qasr.

74. At 1010, 1015, 1024, 1400, 1427, 1443 and 1556 hours on 2 December 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace in the Umm Qasr and Faw areas.

75. At 1045, 1050 and 1052 hours on 3 December 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace over Umm Qasr.

76. At 1700 hours on 4 December 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace over Umm Qasr.

77. At 2300 hours on 5 December 1998, as it was proceeding inside Iraqi territorial waters from Umm Qasr port to the Umm Qasr silo in the direction of Ma'qal port in Basrah with a cargo of 1,500 tons of wheat, the Iraqi freighter Al-Abid was subjected to an act of piracy on the part of some boats and a helicopter belonging to United States forces. A team proceeded to search the freighter while a group of boats surrounded it.

78. At 1021 hours on 6 December 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace over Umm Qasr.

79. At 1035 hours on 7 December 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace over Umm Qasr.

80. At 1407 hours on 7 December 1998, a United States formation dropped a pyrotechnic cartridge in the Tall Kayf area of Ninawa Governorate. It went out while still airborne.

81. At 1800 hours on 7 December 1998, a United States helicopter flew over the United Arab Emirates passenger ferry Jabal Ali I while it was proceeding through the Khawr Abd Allah waterway towards the open sea. The crew of the helicopter addressed provocative questions to the vessel over the radio.

82. On 8 December 1998, a United States helicopter flew over the merchant vessel Guin, which was carrying a cargo of rice under the terms of the memorandum of understanding, addressed provocative questions to its crew as it was proceeding through the Khawr Abd Allah waterway towards Umm Qasr port and tried to impede its passage. The vessel had already been searched in the inspection zone on that day.

83. At 0230 hours on 8 December 1998, a United States helicopter flew over the Iraqi tanker Rayshan as it was proceeding from Faw to Umm Qasr and was at the entry to the Khawr Abd Allah waterway and tried to impede its passage. This continued until 0500 hours on the next day, 9 December.

84. At 1735 hours on 10 December 1998, two United States aircraft dropped two heat flares over Safwan in Basrah Governorate.

85. On 12 December 1998 a United States helicopter intercepted the vessel Al-Bayshah, subjected it to provocation and tried for a full hour to impede its passage through the entry to the Khawr Abd Allah waterway as it was proceeding towards Umm Qasr.

86. At 1015 hours on 12 December 1998, as it was proceeding through the Khawr Abd Allah waterway inside Iraqi territorial waters and heading for Umm Qasr port to take on a cargo of wheat at the Umm Qasr silo, the Iraqi Maritime Transport Company freighter Al-Bay'ah was intercepted by a United States helicopter. The master of the vessel was ordered over the radio to change course, and he refused to do so. The interrogation and harassment continued for a full hour, during which time questions were asked concerning the vessel's cargo, its flag and its destination.

87. Using missiles and aircraft, the United States of America and the United Kingdom launched a brutal armed attack on Iraq that lasted for the four days from 17 to 20 December 1998 and targeted civilian areas, industrial installations, infrastructure, hospitals, health facilities, schools, universities, heritage sites and grain depots. This savage attack left behind hundreds of innocent civilian casualties and inflicted large-scale losses in terms of property damage. Some examples are given hereunder:

(a) At 0105 hours on Thursday, 17 December 1998, using Tomahawk missiles, United States and United Kingdom forces bombarded a grain depot containing 2,600 tons of rice imported under the terms of the memorandum of understanding. The depot was totally destroyed.

(b) On the night of 16/17 December 1998, 327 missiles were fired at Iraq through Kuwaiti airspace, 72 air raids were carried out by fighter aircraft at Kuwaiti bases and 31 raids were carried out from Saudi bases.

(c) On 18 December 1998, 31 missiles were fired from Kuwaiti territory, five air raids were carried out from Kuwaiti territory and 48 raids were carried out from Saudi bases.

(d) On 19 December 1998, 134 missiles were fired at Iraq through Kuwaiti airspace.

(e) On 20 December 1998, 49 air raids were carried out from Kuwaiti bases and 18 raids were carried out from Saudi bases.

(f) On 21 December 1998, despite the fact that the President of the United States had announced a halt to the attack, three air raids against Iraq were carried out from Saudi bases.

(g) On 22 December 1998, four air raids were carried out against Iraq from Kuwaiti bases and four raids were carried out from Saudi bases.

88. At 1417 hours on 22 December 1998, United States aircraft fired two missiles in the northern part of the Basrah area.

89. At 1125 hours on 26 December 1998, four United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace in the Basrah area to the south-east of the Northern Rumaylah oilfields. They were engaged by our air defence units, and the aggressor aircraft were forced to drop their payloads. Another formation, this time of six aircraft, later returned to the same area. They were engaged by our air defence units, acting in self-defence, were forced to drop their payloads and were driven off.

90. At 0943 hours on 27 December 1998, two United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace over Nasiriyah. They were engaged by our air defence units, acting in self-defence, and were driven off.

91. At 1304 hours on 28 December 1998, formations of United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace in the Mosul area. They were engaged by our air defence units, acting in self-defence, and were driven off.

92. At 1337 hours on 28 December 1998, formations of United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace in the Mosul area. They were engaged by our air defence units, acting in self-defence, and were driven off.

93. At 0924 hours on 29 December 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace in the Samawah area and fired three missiles. They were engaged by our air defence units, acting in self-defence, and were driven off.

94. On the morning of 30 December 1998, United States and British aircraft violated Iraqi airspace in Muthanna Governorate and fired six missiles at the village of Āl Sallab. A number of residents were killed and wounded in the

enemy bombardment, several homes were destroyed and serious damage was done to property.

In condemning these repeated acts of aggression against Iraqi civilian areas and installations, we urge you to intervene with the United States and the United Kingdom with a view to inducing them to cease and to renounce any repetition of unwarranted actions that constitute a grave violation on the part of two permanent members of the Security Council of the sovereignty of an independent State and founding Member of the United Nations and that represent a breach of the Charter of the United Nations and of a principle enunciated in Security Council resolution 687 (1991).

We regard all the States involved - whether those whose aircraft and ships commit such acts of aggression or those in whose territory the aircraft are based, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Turkey - as being fully responsible for these actions, for the damage that they cause and for the security-related, economic and moral threat that they represent for the Iraqi people and the Iraqi State. We affirm in this connection the legally established right of Iraq, in accordance with the principle of State responsibility, to seek compensation for the damage it has sustained owing to the perpetration of these hostile acts in violation of the Charter of the United Nations and international law.

(Signed) Mohammed Said AL-SAHAF
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Iraq

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/60
20 January 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN ABKHAZIA, GEORGIA

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to resolution 1187 (1998) of 30 July 1998, by which the Security Council decided to extend the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) until 31 January 1999 and requested me to report three months after the date of the adoption of the resolution on the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, including on the operations of UNOMIG. In compliance with that request, I submitted a report to the Security Council on 29 October 1998 (see S/1998/1012). The present report provides an update of the situation as of 15 January 1999.

2. UNOMIG continues to be headed by my Special Representative for Georgia, Liviu Bota. He is assisted by the Chief Military Observer, Major General Tariq Waseem Ghazi (Pakistan), who succeeded Major General Harun-Ar-Rashid (Bangladesh) on 15 November 1998. The strength of UNOMIG, as of 15 January 1999, stood at 102 military observers (see annex).

II. POLITICAL ASPECTS

3. Following the Athens meeting of the Georgian and Abkhaz sides on confidence-building measures, held from 16 to 18 October 1998, the largest and most representative meeting between the parties since the end of the war of 1993 (see S/1998/1012, paras. 10-12), my Special Representative continued to meet frequently with the two sides and others concerned. In their negotiations, the sides focused on reaching an agreement on security and the non-use of force; the return of refugees and displaced persons to the Gali district; and measures for the economic rehabilitation of Abkhazia.

4. While the above-mentioned efforts were under way, my Special Representative was actively engaged in consultations with the President of Georgia, Eduard Shevardnadze, the Abkhaz leader, Vladislav Ardzinba, and other prominent political figures in Georgia. Each leader continued to express willingness to meet with the other to talk about current problems and to explore possible steps to facilitate a settlement of the conflict.

5. During the reporting period, bilateral contacts between the two sides included visits to Tbilisi, on 29 October and 22 November 1998, by the personal representative of Mr. Ardzinba to the peace process, Anri Jergenia, accompanied by the Abkhaz de facto Deputy Defence Minister, Major General Givi Agrba, for talks with the Georgian State Minister, Vazha Lordkipanidze. The Executive Secretary of the Bilateral Joint Coordination Commission, Zurab Lakerbaia, also facilitated communication between the sides.

6. The group of Friends of the Secretary-General (France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America), actively supported the peace process. The heads of their diplomatic missions in Tbilisi carried out a number of consultations on this matter, including meetings with Mr. Ardzinba on 2 December and President Shevardnadze on 10 December 1998. In addition, the United States announced its readiness to gradually allocate up to $15 million for the rehabilitation of the infrastructure of Abkhazia, Georgia, primarily in the Gali district, if substantial progress in the peace process was achieved.

7. By early November 1998, it appeared that the parties were very close to reaching agreement on two draft documents addressing the three issues mentioned in paragraph 3 above, and it was anticipated that the documents would be signed at a meeting between President Shevardnadze and Mr. Ardzinba. Tentative dates and possible venues for this meeting were discussed. However, the talks suddenly and unexpectedly broke down, reportedly over misunderstandings, and the Abkhaz side stated that it would no longer engage in direct contacts with the Georgian side. The stalemate in the peace talks was accompanied by a sudden and rapid deterioration of the security situation in the zone of conflict. Together, these developments led to the real danger of an outbreak of hostilities similar to that which had taken place in May in the Gali district. In order to prevent such an occurrence and to resume the peace talks, my Special Representative decided urgently to convene the sixth session of the Coordinating Council of the Georgian and Abkhaz sides. The meeting, which was held from 17 to 18 December 1998, took place, exceptionally, at Geneva, as the Abkhaz side refused to travel to Tbilisi where it was supposed to have taken place.

8. The sixth session of the Coordinating Council was held under the chairmanship of my Special Representative and with the participation of representatives of both sides, the Russian Federation in its capacity as facilitator, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the States belonging to the group of Friends of the Secretary-General. The Georgian delegation was led by the State Minister, Vazha Lordkipanidze. The Abkhaz delegation was led by the de facto Prime Minister, Sergei Bagapsh. The Chief Military Observer of UNOMIG, the Assistant United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the United Nations Resident Coordinator in Georgia also attended and addressed the meeting.

9. The agenda of the sixth session included the following three items: (a) issues related to the lasting non-resumption of hostilities and security issues; (b) refugees and internally displaced persons; and (c) economic and social problems. In the course of the session, the Abkhaz delegation stated that it had decided to start the process of the return of refugees to the Gali district on a unilateral basis and appealed to the United Nations, the Russian

Federation as facilitator, OSCE, the States belonging to the group of the Friends of the Secretary-General and the Georgian side to support that decision. The Georgian delegation characterized the Abkhaz statement as mere rhetoric, which did not create any basis for the process of repatriation of refugees and displaced persons. It stated further that such a process was not possible without proper mechanisms and guarantees and without the active participation of the Georgian side and the international community. In the course of the session the two sides decided, inter alia, to convene, in the Gali district, not later than 22 December 1998, an urgent meeting of representatives of the two sides in order to prevent the destabilization of the situation in the zone of conflict and to agree on measures aimed at implementing the bilateral agreements contained in the protocols signed on 25 May 1998 in Gagra and on 24 September 1998 in Sukhumi.

10. From 24 to 25 November 1998, the Chairman-in-Office of OSCE and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland, Bronislaw Geremek, paid a visit to Georgia, as a part of his trip to Transcaucasia, and discussed issues connected with the conflicts in the region with President Shevardnadze and other officials. The issue of regional conflicts, including the conflict in Abkhazia, Georgia, was also on the agenda of the meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council held in Oslo on 2 and 3 December 1998. In their decision on Georgia, the Ministers stressed, inter alia, that the Geneva process was a leading framework for the peaceful settlement of the conflict in Abkhazia, Georgia, and underlined the primary responsibility of the United Nations for advancing that process. They also declared OSCE's readiness to assist the United Nations in its efforts.

11. The Georgian-Abkhaz peace process was also on the agenda of the Executive Secretary of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Boris Berezovski, during his visit to Tbilisi on 18 November 1998. The Executive Secretary was received by President Shevardnadze and met with my Special Representative.

12. On 3 November 1998, the Governments of the Russian Federation and of Georgia concluded two agreements on cooperation on border issues. These agreements provided, inter alia, for a phased transfer by the Russian border guards of property and duties to their Georgian counterparts. The agreements were criticized by the Abkhaz side.

13. On 15 November 1998, elections to local organs of self-governance (councils) were held in Georgia (with the exception of the territory controlled by the Abkhaz side, as well as certain areas in the Tskhinvali region). These were the first such elections since the country regained independence in 1991.

III. OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN GEORGIA

14. Since I last reported to the Security Council on 29 October 1998 (S/1998/1012), there has been no structural change in the operations of UNOMIG. The concept of limited patrolling remains the basis of operations. Under that concept, patrols operate in pairs of mine-protected vehicles during daylight hours along roads connecting population centres or CIS peacekeeping force checkpoints. The CIS peacekeeping force maintains a quick-reaction force and

the UNOMIG helicopter stands by to assist in case of any emergency. Team bases remain closed and the control of operations has thus become more centralized. It will be recalled that, before the hostage taking incident of February 1998, most of the operational patrolling was conducted from the four team bases located at remote points within the Security Zone. The team bases afforded ready access to the population throughout the conflict zone and allowed close liaison with local civil and military authorities. Continued closure of the team bases has curtailed UNOMIG's ability to fully respond to the requirements of its mandate. However, despite these limitations, UNOMIG has been able to achieve a generally satisfactory patrol coverage of the conflict zone through combined ground and helicopter patrols, and is able to observe and verify the parties' compliance with the Moscow Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces of 14 May 1994 (see S/1994/583, annex I) and the Gagra Protocol of 25 May 1998 (see S/1998/497, para. 4).

15. After some delay, the first consignment of five new ballistic-protected vehicles (RG-32 SCOUTS) arrived in Tbilisi on 20 November 1998 and are already being used for patrolling. Eight more vehicles were received on 30 December and will soon become operational after installation of essential communication and other equipment. The introduction of these vehicles will provide greater operational flexibility, which had been curtailed due to the limited number and ageing of the previous mine-protected fleet. Since mine laying continues, particularly in the Gali district, the arrival of additional vehicles will substantially enhance the security of UNOMIG personnel and their ability to reach the more remote locations.

16. The initial phase of the road resurfacing project involving the M-27 trunk road between the Gali Canal and the Inguri River, which had been contracted in August 1998, has now been completed. However, owing both to the poor quality of the work and to winter rains, parts of the road surface have already begun to deteriorate. Nevertheless, it is intended that the project to resurface other roads in the Gali district be continued as this will substantially add to the security of UNOMIG patrols against possible mine threats.

17. The helicopter assigned to UNOMIG in June 1998 provides an essential security back-up for the mission, in particular for medical evacuation. It is also used for supplementing ground patrols, aiding in investigations and allowing access to hard-to-reach areas such as the Kodori Valley. As noted in my previous report (S/1998/1012, para. 27), the addition of a second helicopter would significantly enhance the operational proficiency and security of UNOMIG and the possibility of acquiring one is under review.

18. In pursuance of a decision taken at the fifth session of the Coordinating Council in September 1998, a Joint Investigation Group was to have been set up to investigate violations of the 1994 Moscow Agreement. Despite the fact that an organizational structure was established, with substantial logistical support from UNOMIG, this mechanism has not been successful so far. However, UNOMIG patrols, assisted by military observers with legal expertise, who have recently arrived in the Mission, monitor the investigations carried out by the respective sides or by the CIS peacekeeping force, whenever possible through mutual arrangements. In the assessment of the Chief Military Observer, an effective Joint Investigation Group would be a useful mechanism to ascertain facts,

determine responsibility and discourage violations by the two sides. There is a need for both sides to display greater resolve and willingness to make this group functional and to provide it with legal and administrative backing.

19. The weekly quadripartite meetings were subject to a prolonged boycott of almost two months by the Abkhaz side as a protest against the abduction of Abkhaz militiamen and the failure of the troops of the Georgian Interior Ministry to withdraw from the Khurcha pocket. The Abkhaz side's return to the meetings following the sixth session of the Coordinating Council and the follow-up meeting of 21 December 1998 is part of a positive trend in the last few weeks. The quadripartite meetings, which bring together the two sides in the presence of the CIS peacekeeping force and UNOMIG commanders, have always served as a useful platform for resolving local issues of a military, humanitarian and administrative nature.

IV. COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN GEORGIA AND THE COLLECTIVE PEACEKEEPING FORCES OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES

20. The working relationship with the CIS peacekeeping force has been good at all levels. Close liaison is being maintained through regular meetings and exchange of information. UNOMIG continues to rely on the CIS peacekeeping force for its security and the force remains on standby to respond in case of emergency. Regular exercises are conducted and procedures are coordinated in order to maintain a high degree of readiness.

21. The expiration of the mandate of the CIS peacekeeping force on 30 June 1998 has not affected its presence. The force continues to operate from static checkpoints, located mostly along the ceasefire line and to perform very limited mobile patrolling. UNOMIG continues to observe and report on the force's operations within the framework of the Moscow Agreement. Most of the CIS peacekeeping force was rotated during October and November 1998.

V. SITUATION ON THE GROUND

A. General

22. The situation in the conflict zone remains tense and unstable. There have been frequent exchanges of fire across the ceasefire line and, in addition to small arms, rocket and grenade launchers have at times been employed. Despite UNOMIG's best efforts to put an end to this trend, the incidents could not be checked completely. Terrorist and subversive activities continue, including the laying of mines, particularly in the lower Gali district. The primary targets of these activities have been the CIS peacekeeping force and the Abkhaz militia; however, there seem also to have been cases in which mines have been placed to disrupt civilian traffic. Firing at the CIS peacekeeping force and at Georgian and Abkhaz checkpoints has also continued. The Moscow Agreement is violated by the deployment of prohibited weapons, mine incidents and restrictions on the freedom of movement of UNOMIG. It is a disturbing trend that both parties' responses to UNOMIG's protests are at times casual. The Chief Military Observer

has assessed that there is a need to create greater awareness and understanding of the mandate and modus operandi of UNOMIG among the local commanders and troops on both sides.

B. Security and restricted weapons zones

23. In the Gali sector, the lower part of the area remained the focus of attention. The Abkhaz authorities there have not been able to stop the criminal and terrorist activities and continue to blame the Georgian side for aiding and abetting the groups committing them. During November and December 1998, 15 separate incidents of mine attacks, firing and ambushes led to casualties on all sides. Among the Abkhaz militia, five were killed and eight seriously injured; one soldier of the Georgian Interior Ministry was killed and one injured; and one CIS peacekeeping force soldier was killed and 15 were wounded. In addition, five civilians were killed and 13 were injured. These criminal and terrorist activities seriously impede the normalization of the situation in the region. They prompt reprisals from the Abkhaz side and curtail the operations of UNOMIG and the CIS peacekeeping force. Despite appeals by UNOMIG, there seems to have been no serious effort by the parties to bring an end to them. Given that patrol coverage by UNOMIG is limited, it is at times difficult to report accurately on developments in the conflict zone or to pre-empt hostile actions through timely intervention. In addition, the Abkhaz side accused the Georgian side of launching, on 25 December, an amphibious operation near the village of Primorsk. The Georgian side categorically denied these allegations and UNOMIG failed to find any evidence that could substantiate the Abkhaz claim. Fortunately this incident, apparently based on the dissemination of false information, did not deteriorate into hostilities.

24. It will be recalled that, in my last report (see S/1998/1012, para. 33), I mentioned the efforts being made by the Abkhaz side to encourage those inhabitants who had fled the Gali district in the wake of the May 1998 events to return to their homes. These appeals have been largely unsuccessful, primarily because potential returnees do not have confidence in the still inadequate security conditions in the district. The Abkhaz militia have failed to effectively check criminal acts such as robbery and kidnapping for ransom and have themselves been repeatedly accused by the population of abetting crime. UNOMIG will continue to encourage the efforts of the Gali local administration to redress this situation.

25. The situation in the Zugdidi sector generally remained calm but unstable. The Georgian Interior Ministry troops holding positions in the Khurcha and Gan Mukhuri pockets were not completely withdrawn nor their positions dismantled as had been agreed in the protocol signed in Sukhumi on 24 September 1998. During the reporting period, tensions on the ground mounted and came to a head in early December 1998. When the threat of an outbreak of hostilities seemed imminent, my Special Representative convened the sixth session of the Coordinating Council (see paras. 8 and 9 above), at which a follow-up meeting in the Gali region was agreed upon. Subsequently, delegations of the Georgian and the Abkhaz sides, headed by Mr. Lordkipanidze and Mr. Bagapsh, respectively, and including the leaders of their respective military, met in Gali on 21 December and adopted a protocol which provided for a number of measures aimed at defusing the tensions.

26. On 21 December 1998, one Georgian soldier was killed in an exchange of fire between a checkpoint of the CIS peacekeeping force and a position of the Georgian Interior Ministry troops. This incident adversely affected relations between the CIS peacekeeping force and Georgian Interior Ministry forces. Soon after the incident, tension increased further when, for the first time, a mine attack against a CIS peacekeeping force vehicle took place in territory controlled by the Georgian side.

27. Pursuant to the protocol agreed at the 21 December meeting in Gali, troops have been pulled back within the Khurcha pocket (although the positions have not been completely dismantled), an operational communications link between the commanders of the two sides in the area of Khurcha/Nabakevi has been established and the heads of administration of the Zugdidi and Gali districts have been connected by a direct telephone line. These measures have resulted in a calming of the atmosphere along the ceasefire line.

C. Kodori Valley

28. Patrolling in the Kodori Valley was resumed in August 1998, but has been hampered by the destruction of the bridge on the road leading to the valley. As a result, vehicular patrols can be conducted only up to the last CIS peacekeeping force checkpoint. At present, the longer route to the upper valley from the Zugdidi side cannot be used because the mountain pass is blocked by snow. Limited numbers of helicopter patrols - one or two per month - are being launched to visit the Georgian-controlled portion of the valley. As these are not considered adequate for effective observation and reporting, a proposal to reopen the team base is under review. UNOMIG is also consulting with the authorities about an early repair of the bridge. On the basis of UNOMIG's limited patrolling, the situation in the valley is assessed as generally calm and quiet.

VI. SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

29. The security and safety of UNOMIG personnel are constantly under review both in the mission and at headquarters. There has been no incident of a serious nature against UNOMIG personnel during the period under review. While the situation in the security zone remains unstable, the steps taken by the parties pursuant to the 21 December meeting in Gali (see para. 25 above) demonstrate a measure of good will on their part in addressing UNOMIG's security concerns. The pull-back of the troops from the Khurcha pocket and the resulting improvement of the security situation in the region have reduced the risk that UNOMIG might be caught in the crossfire during incidents between the parties.

30. The parties have also taken steps against the targeting of UNOMIG personnel or assets for either political or criminal reasons. The UNOMIG headquarters in Sukhumi is under the protection of the "Presidential Guards", who are more disciplined than the Abkhaz militia formerly deployed there and the local law enforcement agencies in Abkhazia, Georgia, have responded whenever approached by UNOMIG for specific assistance. The Georgian Interior Ministry troops continue

to protect the Zugdidi sector headquarters and the new logistics base in Zugdidi.

31. The introduction of the ballistic-protected vehicles will definitely improve the security of UNOMIG personnel while on operational patrols. While not entirely satisfactory, the deployment of lightly armed international security staff has been welcomed in UNOMIG and is expected to impact positively on the internal security of the mission. It will be recalled that the adverse security environment prevailing at the time had necessitated the suspension of active operations by military observers in February 1998. With an overall improvement in the security environment expected as a result of the steps taken by UNOMIG, the possibility of reopening some team bases is currently under review.

32. While the measures taken by the parties, as well as the measures taken by UNOMIG itself, have created a noticeably better security environment, concerns do remain. The September 1998 bus incident remains unsolved and the culprits have not been apprehended. In addition, there is the danger that common criminality may further increase as a result of deteriorating economic conditions, as well as the drug abuse and alcoholism to which many have resorted.

VII. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS

33. During the period under review, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Acción contra el Hambre (ACH), Médecins sans Frontières (MSF-France) and the Halo Trust continued their assistance to many of the most vulnerable civilians in Abkhazia, Georgia. However, in the Gali district, access to vulnerable people outside of Gali town continued to be impeded because of the mining of some roads and other activities which placed both beneficiaries and aid workers at risk. As a result, many vulnerable people still lack the material assistance they require for the winter months, as well as the protection assistance that could be afforded to them through humanitarian agencies. In the tense security context, aid agencies continue to appeal to the Government of Georgia and the Abkhaz authorities to provide them with full support to ensure that assistance reaches civilians in need.

34. As a result of the May 1998 events, when a majority of the people who had spontaneously returned to the Gali district again had to flee their homes, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) had to shift the focus of its operations to the Zugdidi side and all the agency's international staff temporarily vacated the Sukhumi office. Nonetheless, that office, which is now operated by local staff, continues to maintain a liaison function (see S/1998/1012, para. 19). The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs also relocated its base for coordination activities in western Georgia from Sukhumi to Zugdidi, from where it continues to operate. The World Food Programme (WFP) has extended its emergency food programme through March 1999 to provide wheat flour, vegetable oil and sugar to the most vulnerable internally displaced persons in the Zugdidi area. In October 1998, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), in cooperation with the Georgian Ministry of Education, provided school supplies and school

furniture to some of the formerly occupied schools. UNHCR has completed its emergency shelter rehabilitation programme as well as the "winterization" of communal centres in the Zugdidi area and is about to finalize a programme for the rehabilitation of school buildings which have housed internally displaced persons since the events of May 1998.

35. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and UNHCR continue to monitor the humanitarian consequences of the severe drought of last summer in western Georgia, as well as the spillover effects of the economic crisis in Russia (see S/1998/1012, para. 21). Moreover, as adolescents and young adults are increasingly turning to crime, drug abuse and violent behaviour owing to persistent isolation since the war of 1992-1993 and to steadily declining economic conditions in Abkhazia, Georgia, there is now a critical need for programmes which can provide psycho-social support to this population. The activities of the few programmes which currently address these needs should continue to be supported and expanded.

36. The Head of the United Nations Human Rights Office in Abkhazia, Georgia, relinquished his post at the end of November 1998 after completing his contract. Currently, the Office is staffed with one OSCE Human Rights Officer and, since the end of December, with one junior United Nations Human Rights Officer. Recently, the Office started implementing a technical assistance project which provides seminars in the field of human rights, delivery of specialized literature to libraries and translation of United Nations publications in the field of human rights.

VIII. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS

37. Since the issuance of my last report, turbulence in the international financial markets has affected the stability of the national currency, the lari. In September 1998, following the devaluation of the Russian rouble, speculative pressure started to build on the lari. At the beginning of December, the lari lost approximately 50 per cent of its value in relation to the United States dollar before regaining part of its losses during the second half of the month. In addition, exports to the Russian Federation, which represented almost 30 per cent of the total exports of Georgia, have almost completely ceased. With some 30 per cent of its foreign market thus inaccessible, the Georgian foreign trade balance has been severely affected. Furthermore, it is expected that the level of remittances to Georgia by Georgian citizens working in the Russian Federation will decrease, while Georgians owning businesses in that country will continue to withdraw dollars from Georgia to sustain their investment there. As a consequence, it is expected that pressure on the value of the lari will continue.

38. The single most important obstacle to Georgia's economic development continues to be the deficit of the country's balance of payments. This problem is the consequence of the low level of government revenues, which did not exceed 8.6 per cent of the gross national product in 1998. Inability to collect taxes and a high level of tax evasion are the main causes of this problem, which could compromise the future development of the country. As a consequence, during 1998, the Government was not able to meet already minimal social expenditure

targets nor to sustain a programme of public investments in areas of social interest. Efforts to improve the situation have not been successful.

39. Even though the above considerations reflect weaknesses in the social and economic structure of the country, overall economic results were positive. It is estimated that, for the second consecutive year, the economy will continue to recover at a rate of growth of above 10 per cent in relation to the previous year, while inflation is still very modest, around 7 per cent, the lowest level since independence. In order to sustain economic recovery and provide resources to improve living conditions and reduce poverty, the Government will have to concentrate its efforts in 1999 on fighting corruption in the public service and on improving tax collection to reduce the budget deficit. Progress on both fronts will enhance credibility in public administration and will provide the resources needed to sustain public expenditures.

IX. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

40. By its resolution 52/242 of 26 June 1998, the General Assembly appropriated an amount of $19,439,280 (gross), equivalent to $1,619,940 per month for UNOMIG for the period from 1 July 1998 to 30 June 1999. The assessment of these amounts is subject to the decision of the Security Council to extend the mandate of the Mission. In addition, I obtained a commitment authorization from the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions in the amount of $1.5 million for the strengthening of internal security of UNOMIG.

41. Should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of UNOMIG beyond 31 January 1999, as recommended in paragraph 47 below, the cost of maintaining the Mission until 30 June 1999 would be limited to the above-mentioned resources. I shall report to the General Assembly on the additional requirements needed, if any, for the maintenance of the Mission beyond 30 June 1999.

42. As at 31 December 1998, unpaid assessed contributions to the UNOMIG Special Account amounted to $8.4 million. The total of outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at that date amounted to $1.6 billion.

X. OBSERVATIONS

43. The precarious situation on the ground over the last few months has made it abundantly clear that bilateral contacts between the Georgian and Abkhaz sides, whenever they can be held, help to prevent armed hostilities from breaking out. Bilateral talks also remain the most effective means of achieving political progress. I therefore, once again, urge both sides to seek and engage in dialogue and to expand their contacts at all levels.

44. In view of the stalled negotiations on the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes in the region, I also appeal to both sides to treat the issue as a matter of utmost urgency. The issue of return is a strictly humanitarian question which should not be used as an instrument to advance

political causes. It should also be stressed once again that the return of refugees and displaced persons is a right which is imprescriptible (see S/1998/375, para. 45).

45. While the political process towards a settlement has been slow, and at times has seemed to be almost blocked, UNOMIG has continued to carry out its mandate, thus contributing to a lessening of tensions on the ground, preventing an exacerbation of potentially serious incidents and providing a climate in which substantive negotiations can take place on the political level. Although much remains to be done before the environment in which UNOMIG operates can be said to be satisfactory, the measures taken by the mission have resulted in a situation in which UNOMIG military observers have been able to conduct limited patrolling without serious security incidents during the last three months. Should this situation continue, and in view of the deployment of internationally recruited security personnel and the arrival of ballistic-protected vehicles, a return to the patrolling patterns in effect before February 1998 might reasonably be contemplated in the coming months. For this to happen, however, it is clear that the two sides in the conflict must take substantive and tangible measures to curb criminal and terrorist activities. I therefore once again urge the parties to live up to their responsibility to ensure the security and safety of UNOMIG and its personnel.

46. The recent intensification of activities related to the peace process, the establishment of mechanisms for negotiations and the implementation of UNOMIG's mandate, together with the exercise of local good offices, have highlighted the need for a strengthening of the civilian component of the Mission, particularly in the field of political and civil affairs and public information. Specifically, an additional capacity in the political field on the ground is needed to make even better use of the existing mechanisms, the Coordinating Council and the quadripartite meetings, which have proven their usefulness over the last months in preventing hostilities and defusing tensions. An additional modest civil affairs capacity would allow UNOMIG to maintain better liaison with the humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organizations. Public information activities are needed to promote a better understanding of UNOMIG's mandate and activities by the parties and within the population in the various sectors, as well as to provide impartial information for the better performance of the Mission and the advancement of the peace process. These requirements are currently under review.

47. Given that UNOMIG remains indispensable for maintaining a situation conducive to the search for a political settlement of the conflict, I recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of the Mission for a further six months until 31 July 1999. I urge the parties to use this time for substantive negotiations towards a settlement.

48. I wish to take this opportunity to thank my Special Representative, Liviu Bota, the Chief Military Observer, Major General Tariq Waseem Ghazi, and all the civilian and military personnel of UNOMIG who continue to serve the cause of peace in difficult and sometimes dangerous conditions.

Annex

Composition of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia as at 15 January 1999

Country	Military Observers
Albania	1
Austria	4
Bangladesh	8
Czech Republic	4
Denmark	5
Egypt	3
France	5
Germany	11
Greece	3
Hungary	5
Indonesia	4
Jordan	6
Pakistan	7
Poland	4
Republic of Korea	3
Russian Federation	3
Sweden	5
Switzerland	4
Turkey	5
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	7
United States of America	2
Uruguay	3
Total	102

Map No. 3837 Rev. 19 UNITED NATIONS
January 1999

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Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/61
19 January 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON

(for the period from 16 July 1998 to 15 January 1999)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of Security Council resolution 1188 (1998) of 30 July 1998, by which the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for a further period of six months, until 31 January 1999. It covers developments since the previous report, dated 16 July 1998 (S/1998/652).

II. SITUATION IN THE AREA OF OPERATION

2. During the past six months, hostilities continued between the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) and its local Lebanese auxiliary, the de facto forces (DFF), on the one hand, and armed elements who have proclaimed their resistance against the Israeli occupation, on the other. UNIFIL recorded 386 operations conducted by armed elements against IDF/DFF (34 in the second half of July, 80 in August, 64 in September, 69 in October, 71 in November, 47 in December and 21 in the first half of January). This is the highest number in a long time. There were also reports of some 280 operations north of the Litani River. The vast majority of those operations were carried out by the Islamic Resistance, the military wing of the Shiite Muslim Hizbullah organization. The Shiite movement Amal took responsibility for some 30 operations; a few were attributed to other Lebanese groups. The armed elements employed small arms, mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, anti-tank missiles, recoilless rifles, rockets and explosive devices. They fired some 3,000 mortar rounds, rockets and anti-tank missiles, as compared to about 3,500 rounds in the previous reporting period.

3. IDF/DFF, in response to attacks or in operations they initiated, employed artillery, mortars, tanks, helicopter gunships, fixed-wing aircraft and explosive devices. IDF continued its practice of conducting pre-emptive artillery bombardments but reduced long-range patrols forward of its positions. UNIFIL recorded close to 18,000 rounds of artillery, mortar, tanks and missiles fired by IDF/DFF, an increase of 70 per cent over the last reporting period. IDF conducted seven air raids in UNIFIL's area of operation: near Shaqra

(3 November), Zibqin (12 November), Brashit (17 November), Yatar (18 November), Rishknaniyah (27 November), Tallet Huqban (3 December) and Zibqin (13 January). Another 58 air raids were carried out against targets north of the Litani River. As before, the Israeli navy patrolled the Lebanese territorial waters in the south and continued to impose restrictions on local fisherfolk.

4. UNIFIL continued its efforts to limit the conflict and to protect the inhabitants from the fighting. Through its network of checkpoints and observation posts, an active programme of patrolling, and continuous contacts with the parties, the Force did its best to prevent its area of operation from being used for hostile activities and to defuse situations that could lead to escalation. The Force was also deployed, as necessary, to provide a measure of protection to villages and to farmers working in the fields. Nevertheless, civilians were again killed or injured in UNIFIL's area of operation as follows: a civilian was injured in Majdal Zun on 9 August by IDF/DFF fire. Firing by armed elements injured two civilians near Rihane on 11 October and wounded another near At Tiri on 4 December. On 7 December, a civilian was wounded in At Tiri by IDF/DFF fire. On 17 December, a civilian was killed near Shaqra by IDF fire. On 8 January 1999, a civilian was killed and three others were wounded near Markabe by rockets fired by armed elements.

5. A number of serious incidents were also reported from outside the area of operation. On 31 July, a civilian was killed by a roadside bomb placed by armed elements. On 5 August, a civilian was killed by IDF fire. On 25 August, following the death of a DFF member, IDF/DFF shelled Mashghara (western Bekaa), wounding six civilians. The same evening, the Islamic Resistance fired at least 40 rockets into northern Israel, causing injuries to Israeli civilians. On 13 November, a civilian was killed and another was wounded near Arab Salim by IDF fire. The most serious incident occurred on 22 December, when a woman and her six children were killed in an Israeli air raid in the Bekaa Valley. The next morning, the Islamic Resistance fired more than 40 rockets into northern Israel, causing minor injuries to Israeli civilians. On 3 January, seven civilians were injured in an Israeli air raid in the Bekaa Valley.

6. Within the Israeli-controlled area (ICA), Israel continued to maintain a civil administration and security service. The infrastructure in ICA (road system, electricity, water supply, public buildings) continued to be improved with funds provided by the Government of Lebanon. However, ICA remained economically dependent on Israel, where more than 2,500 of the inhabitants go to work every day. Late in October, Israeli civilian contractors removed topsoil from the al-Marj area and took it to Israel. This activity ended after UNIFIL raised it with IDF.

7. IDF/DFF continued to conduct search operations in several villages in ICA and, from time to time, restricted the movement of the inhabitants. A number were arrested and imprisoned in Khiam, while others were expelled from their villages and ordered to leave ICA. On 2 September, a local civilian employee of UNIFIL was arrested and sent to Khiam; he was released on 1 October.

8. In carrying out its functions, the Force at times encountered hostile reactions from both sides. On 31 July, in the Irish battalion sector, armed elements threatened and fired close to United Nations personnel investigating a

possible arms cache. UNIFIL protested through the Lebanese army. On 12 August, following an altercation at a United Nations checkpoint, UNIFIL learned of an order by local IDF/DFF security personnel in Hasbaiya to fire at United Nations vehicles. The next day, a UNIFIL armoured personnel carrier came under small arms fire near Hasbaiya. The matter was resolved through negotiations.

9. In July 1996, UNIFIL obtained a commitment from IDF to respect a safety zone around UNIFIL positions and received assurances from the Islamic Resistance that it would not operate in the vicinity of UNIFIL positions. Although both sides, by and large, showed restraint in this regard, there has been some slippage. Incidents of armed elements operating close to United Nations positions became more frequent, and firings at or close to United Nations positions and personnel increased to 98 (70 by IDF/DFF, 25 by armed elements and 3 by unidentified elements) from 72 during the last reporting period. On 19 August, four artillery rounds fired by IDF landed near a United Nations vehicle, injuring a Polish soldier. On 16 September, a foot patrol of the Norwegian battalion near the village of Blat came under fire from an Israeli tank; a Norwegian soldier was wounded. UNIFIL protested these incidents to the authorities concerned.

10. UNIFIL continued to assist the civilian population in its area of operation and ICA in the form of medical care, harvest patrols and the distribution of educational material and equipment to poorer schools and orphanages. In addition, water projects, equipment or services for schools and orphanages, and supplies to social services and needy people were provided from resources made available by troop-contributing countries. UNIFIL medical centres and mobile teams provided care to an average of 4,200 civilian patients per month and a field dental programme treated approximately 200 cases per month. UNIFIL also assisted the Government of Lebanon in transporting and distributing supplies to villages in ICA when they faced shortages owing to restrictions imposed by IDF/DFF. Throughout the period, UNIFIL cooperated closely on humanitarian matters with the Lebanese authorities, United Nations agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross and other organizations and agencies operating in Lebanon.

11. As in the past, UNIFIL continued the disposal of unexploded ordnance in its area of operation. In all, 41 controlled explosions were carried out. The Force also helped to fight the fires which devastated large tracts of land in August and September.

12. The monitoring group set up in accordance with the understanding of 26 April 1996 held 16 meetings at UNIFIL headquarters to consider complaints by Israel and Lebanon. UNIFIL provided facilities for the meetings as well as transport for the members of the group.

III. ORGANIZATIONAL MATTERS

13. At the end of November, an Indian battalion was deployed in the east sector, replacing the Norwegian unit, which departed UNIFIL after more than 20 years of service. As of December 1998, UNIFIL comprised 4,483 troops from Fiji (588), Finland (492), France (247), Ghana (646), India (617),

Ireland (611), Italy (46), Nepal (604) and Poland (632). UNIFIL was assisted in its tasks by 51 military observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). In addition, UNIFIL employed 486 civilian staff, of whom 142 were recruited internationally and 344 locally. Major-General Jioji Konousi Konrote continued as Force Commander. The deployment of UNIFIL is shown on the attached map.

14. Since the establishment of UNIFIL, 222 members of the Force have lost their lives: 76 as a result of firings or bomb explosions, 92 in accidents and 54 from other causes. A total of 334 have been wounded by firing, or by mine or bomb explosions.

15. UNIFIL maintained close contact with the Lebanese authorities on matters of mutual concern. Those authorities provided valuable assistance in connection with the rotation of troops and logistic activities in Beirut. The Lebanese army was helpful in defusing confrontations with armed elements. It also provided accommodation for some UNIFIL contingents while on leave in Lebanon. The Force continued to cooperate with the Lebanese Internal Security Forces on matters pertaining to the maintenance of law and order.

16. The problem of the rents owed by the Government of Lebanon to the owners of the land and premises used by UNIFIL has still not been resolved. Not all owners have received payment and there is continuing controversy over the lists of owners prepared by the Lebanese authorities.

IV. FINANCIAL MATTERS

17. The General Assembly, by its resolution 52/237 of 26 June 1998, appropriated to the Special Account for UNIFIL an amount of $143.0 million gross, equivalent to a monthly rate of $11.9 million gross, for the maintenance of the Force for the period from 1 July 1998 to 30 June 1999. Therefore, should the Council decide to extend the mandate of UNIFIL for a further six months, the cost of maintaining the Force during that period would be limited to the monthly rate approved by the General Assembly.

18. As at 31 December 1998, unpaid assessments to the Special Account for UNIFIL for the period since its inception to 31 January 1999 amounted to $112.9 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at that date amounted to $1,593.2 million.

V. OBSERVATIONS

19. During the past six months, fighting in south Lebanon continued at an increased pace and the situation in the area remained volatile and dangerous, with a heightened risk of escalation. Regrettably, civilians were again killed and injured. As before, UNIFIL did its best to limit the conflict and to protect the inhabitants.

20. No new developments emerged from my recent contacts with the parties and others concerned regarding the implementation of Security Council resolution

425 (1978). I shall continue to follow this matter closely and revert to the Council should there be any change in the situation.

21. The Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations, in a letter addressed to me on 8 January 1999 (S/1999/22), conveyed his Government's request that the Security Council extend the mandate of UNIFIL for a further period of six months.

22. While UNIFIL continues to be prevented from implementing the mandate contained in resolution 425 (1978), its contribution to stability and the protection it is able to afford the population of the area remain important. I therefore recommend that the Security Council respond positively to the request of the Government of Lebanon and extend the mandate of UNIFIL for another period of six months, until 31 July 1999.

23. I must again draw attention to the serious shortfall in the funding of the Force. At present, unpaid assessments amount to $112.9 million. This represents money owed to the Member States contributing the troops that make up the Force. I appeal to all Member States to pay their assessments promptly and in full and to clear all remaining arrears. I should also like to express my gratitude to the Governments contributing troops to the Force, in particular those of developing countries, for their understanding and patience in these difficult circumstances.

24. In conclusion, I wish to pay tribute to Major-General Jioji Konousi Konrote and to the men and women under his command for the manner in which they have carried out their difficult and often dangerous task. Their discipline and bearing have been of a high order, reflecting credit on themselves, on their countries and on the United Nations.

وزع بعثة الأمم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان
في شهر كانون الثاني/يناير ١٩٩٩
1999 年1月联黎部队的部署情形
UNIFIL DEPLOYMENT AS OF JANUARY 1999
DÉPLOIEMENT DE LA FINUL EN JANVIER 1999
ДИСЛОКАЦИЯ ВСООНЛ НА ЯНВАРЬ 1999
DESPLIEGUE DE LA FPNUL EN ENERO DE 1999
LEBANON
ISRAEL
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
Şūr (Tyre)
TRANSIT BASE
NAQOURA
FIJIBATT
NEPBATT
GHANBATT
FINBATT
IRISHBATT
HQ UNIFIL
LOG POLAND
COMP FRANCE
ITALY
MP COMPOSITE
POLAND
OGL
HQ FIJI
HQ NEPAL
HQ FINLAND
HQ GHANA
HQ IRELAND
POLAND
FMR
HIN (OGL)
LAB (OGL)
Ra's an Nāqūrah (Rosh Haniqra)
Ra's ad Durayjot
Tallet Huqban
Jabal Bāṣil
Map No. 3000 Rev. 45 UNITED NATIONS
January 1999


Department of Public Information
Cartographic Section
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Ouardiyé
Aichiye
Habbush
Kafer Roumane
Mourhbiye
Kaoukaba
Mazra'at Ouazaiye
HQ INDIA
Râsbayya
Mahmoudiye
Blâte
Marj 'Uyun
Ebel es Saqi
Rachaiya el Foukhar
Shab'a
Kafr Tibnit
Khardala
Tell Dibbine
INDBATT
Arnun
Al Qulay'ah
Al Khiyam
Kafer Choûba
Chateau de Beaufort
Kheube
KHIAM (OGL)
El Meri
Yohmor
Dayr Mimas
Itt Taibe
Al Qantarah
Kafer Kela
Metulla
Majdal Shams
Qabrikha
Misgav'am
Bani Hayyan
Kefar Gil'adi
Markaba
MAR (OGL)
Qiryat Shemona
Hulâ
Ramin
Shaqrah
Mays al Jabal
Blida
Aytarun
Ramot Naftali
'Alma
Ben Zimra
مركز مراقبة
观察所
Observation post
Poste d'observation
Наблюдательный пункт
Puesto de observacion
نقطة تفتيش
检查站
Check point
Point de controle
Контрольный пункт
Puesto de control
قاعدة
基地
Base
Base
База
Base
موقع مؤقت
临时驻地
Temporary position
Position temporaire
Временная позиция
Posición provisional
الحدود الفاصلة بين كتائب قوة الأمم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان
联黎部队各营之间界限
UNIFIL Inter-Battalion boundaries
Limites des secteurs des différents bataillons de la Force
Разделительные линии между районами расположения батальонов ВСООНЛ
Limites entre batallones de la Fuerza
حدود مناطق عمليات قوة الأمم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان
联黎部队行动地区界限西边和北边
UNIFIL Operational boundaries. West and North
Limite de la zone d'operations de la Force à l'ouest et au nord
Оперативные рубежи ВСООНЛ Запад и Север
Limites de las zonas de operaciones de la Fuerza. Oeste y Norte
وحدة لبنانية
黎巴嫩单位
Lebanese Unit
Unité libanaise
Ливанские подразделения
Unidad libanesa
موقع لقوات الدفاع الإسرائيلية و/أو «جيش جنوب لبنان»
以色列国防军和/或"南黎巴嫩军"阵地
Israeli Defence Forces and/or "South Lebanon Army" Position
Position des Forces de défense israéliennes et/ou de "l'armée du Liban du Sud"
Позиция израильских сил обороны и/или "южноливанской армии"
Posición de la Fuerza de Defensa de Israel y/o del "Ejército del Líbano meridional"
الامتداد الشمالي للمنطقة التي تسيطر عليها إسرائيل
以色列控制地区向北延伸部分
Northward extension of Israeli controlled area
Extension vers le nord de la zone contrôlée par Israel
Северная часть территории, контролируемой Израилем
Extension septentrional de la zona controlada por Israel
المساحة التقريبية لما يقع تحت السيطرة الإسرائيلية من منطقة عمل قوة الأمم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان
联黎部队行动地区内在以色列控制下地区概况
Approximate area under Israeli control in UNIFIL area of operation
Perimetre approximatif de la zone sous contrôle israelien dans la zone d'opérations de la FINUL
Примерный район в зоне действия ВСООНЛ, находящийся под контролем Израиля
Area aproximada bajo control israeli dentro de la zone de operaciones de la Fuerza
0 1 2 3 4 5 km
0 1 2 3 mi

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/62
20 January 1999
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 15 JANUARY 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF GERMANY TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to bring to your attention the statement by the Presidency of the European Union on the Sudan issued on 14 January 1999 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dieter KASTRUP
Permanent Representative of Germany
to the United Nations

99-01400 (E) 200199 200199

/...

Annex

[Original: English and French]

Statement on the Sudan issued on 14 January 1999 by the Presidency of the European Union

The European Union strongly requests the Government of the Sudan and all other parties to the armed conflict in southern Sudan to extend the current ceasefire which expires on 15 January 1999 to all parts of the country without any time limit in order to facilitate humanitarian assistance to the suffering people of the Sudan.

At the same time, the European Union equally supports the mission of the Presidency of the Intergovernmental Authority for Development Partners Forum for the Sudan to the region, which is scheduled for the end of January 1999.

The Central and Eastern European countries associated with the European Union, the associated country Cyprus and the countries of the European Free Trade Association members of the European Economic Area align themselves with the present statement.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/63
20 January 1999
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 18 JANUARY 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF GERMANY TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to bring to your attention the statement by the Presidency of the European Union on the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia issued on 15 January 1999 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dieter KASTRUP
Permanent Representative of Germany
to the United Nations

99-01406 (E) 200199 200199

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Annex

[Original: English and French]

Statement on the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia, issued on 15 January 1999 by the Presidency of the European Union

The European Union reiterates its full support for the proposals of the High-Level Delegation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) for a framework agreement, which was endorsed at the OAU's Central Organ Summit Meeting on 17 December 1998 and to the OAU's ongoing commitment to mediate in the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia. The European Union is ready to assist the OAU further in that endeavour.

The European Union urges both parties to the conflict to cooperate fully with the OAU mediation and to renew their efforts in order to achieve a peaceful negotiated settlement of their conflict in all its aspects. It is of primary importance that the OAU proposals for a framework agreement be accepted and put into practice without further delay.

While remaining seriously concerned at the continuing flow of arms into the region, the European Union once again calls upon both parties to continue to refrain from any military action and to work for a de-escalation of the conflict by adopting policies geared to the restoration of confidence between the Governments and the peoples of Eritrea and Ethiopia, including measures to improve the humanitarian situation.

The Central and Eastern European countries associated with the European Union, the associated country Cyprus and the countries of the European Free Trade Association, members of the European Economic Area align themselves with this statement.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/64
20 January 1999
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 20 JANUARY 1999 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of a note verbale dated 13 January 1999 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates addressed to the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Abu Dhabi. It refers to the manoeuvres carried out by air, ground and naval forces of the Iranian Army and Guard under the name "Unity 77" over a five-day period between 4 to 10 December 1998 and protests against the fact that the manoeuvres included the occupied islands belonging to the United Arab Emirates, namely the Greater Tunb, the Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yacub Yousif AL-HOSANI
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

99-01428 (E) 210199 210199

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Annex

Note verbale dated 13 January 1999 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates addressed to the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Abu Dhabi

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates presents its compliments to the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Abu Dhabi.

The Ministry refers to the manoeuvres carried out by air, ground and naval forces of the Iranian Army and Guard under the name "Unity 77" over a five-day period between 4 and 10 December 1998 in which 160 naval vessels and 120 aircraft took part, 350 sorties were flown and surface-to-air missiles were used, as reported by Colonel Isa Golvardi, spokesman for the manoeuvres. The Ministry would like to inform the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran that the fact that the manoeuvres included the United Arab Emirates islands of the Greater Tunb, the Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa is to be considered a violation on the part of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran of the sovereignty of the United Arab Emirates and part of an ongoing attempt by the Islamic Republic of Iran to perpetuate the occupation.

Accordingly, the United Arab Emirates wishes to inform the Islamic Republic of Iran that it protests against this unlawful action in the strongest terms. It regards this and all previous measures taken by the Islamic Republic of Iran on the islands as unwarranted acts of provocation that do not confer any rights on the Islamic Republic of Iran with respect to the islands.

The United Arab Emirates reaffirms its sovereignty over the islands in question. It once again affirms that it does not recognize any other sovereignty over the islands, and it reserves all of its rights with regard the Greater Tunb, the Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs takes this opportunity to convey to the Embassy the assurances of its highest consideration.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/65
21 January 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 21 JANUARY 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ANGOLA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to request that the attached note verbale, dated 20 January 1999, from Higino Carneiro, Vice Minister for Territorial Administration, addressed to Issa Diallo, Special Representative of the Secretary-General, concerning the crash of the plane in Bailundo, be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Afonso VAN DUNEM "MBINDA"
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Note verbale dated 20 January 1999 from the Ministry of Territorial Administration of Angola addressed to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Angola

The Ministry of Territorial Administration presents its best wishes to Mr. Issa Diallo, Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in Angola, and would sincerely like to wish that all the efforts that you undertake bear fruit for all Angolans.

We would like to take this occasion to acknowledge receipt of your note verbale dated 15 January 1999 only on 17 January 1999 of which I have taken very good note.

The Angolan Government has analysed your request very carefully and I should like to inform you that contacts have been established with the Command of the Northern Centre (Huambo) so as to coordinate all the actions with a view to guaranteeing security for the team that will be sent to Bailundo.

I should also like to let you know that these actions have to take place during the period between 20 and 23 January 1999.

We would also like to ask you to transmit to the international community our Government's profound concern about what has taken place, and assure you that the Government of Angola will spare no efforts to make known what really happened with the passengers of that flight.

Higino CARNEIRO
(General)
Vice Minister of
Territorial Administration

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/66
21 January 1999
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 14 JANUARY 1999 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE SUDAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I should like to draw your attention to the final report of the International Commission of Inquiry (Rwanda) (S/1998/1096) dated 18 November 1998, and, in particular, to paragraphs 18 and 20 thereof, where it is claimed that between 5,000 and 8,000 of the former Forces armées rwandaises (ex-FAR) and Interahamwe have been located in the southern Sudan and training in Juba, Amadi and Ngangala.

The Government of the Sudan generally and specifically denies the allegations put forward in the two aforementioned paragraphs, and wishes to make clear the following:

1. With regard to each of these allegations, that are derived from suspect sources in which the report itself makes clear little confidence is to be placed, the Commission states that it has not been able directly to verify the reports. We therefore feel justified in wondering how it can be proper for the Commission to relay dubious information and issue it in a Security Council document without having had it verified by independent sources, in particular since this information relates to grave and sensitive issues, namely, the violation of Security Council resolutions concerning the embargo on the sale of arms.

2. It is quite clear that Commission representatives visited camps belonging to the rebel movement in southern Sudan and obtained their information there. Naturally, since it serves the interests of the rebel movement to do so, it did not hesitate to level random accusations against the Sudanese Government, in the knowledge that with the exception of Juba, all the areas referred to in the report are under rebel control.

   The very numbers cited - the claim that there are between 5,000 and 8,000 ex-FAR in the city of Juba - give the allegation the lie. If it were true, it would surely have become obvious to the many different foreign sources and organizations working in that city.

The references made to the Sudan in this report are a vile attempt to drag it into the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in which the Government of the Sudan officially refused to become militarily involved. Furthermore, the Government of the Sudan has always strongly condemned, and continues to condemn, the crime of genocide perpetrated in Rwanda, in keeping with the Sudan's commitment to the Charter of the United Nations and the Charter of the Organization of African Unity.

The references in paragraphs 18 and 20 of the final report of the Commission make it clear that the Commission has exceeded its basic mandate, which was to collect information and investigate the illegal supply of arms to former Rwandan government forces in violation of the relevant Security Council resolutions. The Commission has relayed information obtained from dubious sources as part of the testimony of the report, while affirming that it has not been able directly to verify that information.

The Government of the Sudan trusts that in future the Commission will be precise and objective, and ensure that it is in contact with the primary sources when allegations such as those which appear in its report are made, and that it will verify such allegations from the official authorities in the State concerned before publishing and presenting them as established fact.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mubarak Hussein RAHMTALLA
Chargé d'affaires a.i.